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On Predication, A Conceptualist View
Abstract: Predication, as the nexus between a subject and a predicate expression, is the 
basis of the unity of a speech act, including speech acts in the plural and speech acts that 
involve mass nouns. A speech act, of course, is an overt expression of a mental act, e.g., a 
judgment; and therefore the unity of a speech act such as an assertion is really the unity 
of the judgment that underlies that act. Such a mental act, and therefore the speech act 
as well, has a unity based on how the referential and predicable roles of the subject and 
predicate expressions combine and function together respectively. What we propose here is 
to explain this unity of predication in terms of a conceptualist theory of logical forms that 
we claim underlies at least some important aspects of thought and natural language. Our 
conceptualist logic also contains an account of the medieval identity (two-name) theory 
of the copula, as well as an account of plural and mass noun reference and predication, the 
truth conditions of which are based on a logic of plurals and mass nouns.
Keywords: predication, reference, pluralities, mass nouns, Conceptualism, cognitive ca-
pacities, copula, unsaturatedness, Medieval Logic,
0. Introduction
A speech act such as an assertion is not just a jumble of words, nor is the judgment 
that underlies it a stream of mental flotsam. An assertion and the judgment under-
lying it have a unity, something that accounts for the coherence of the judgment 
and the assertion it underlies. What is the basis of that unity or coherence? How 
can we account for it? It cannot be the rules of grammar that tells us how the 
words and phrases are to be correctly put together so as to express a judgment or 
a thought. Most people do not know the rules of grammar even after they have 
become competent in speaking and expressing their thoughts. So just what does 
hold the parts of an assertion or of a thought together?
As a speech act, an assertion is an overt expression of a mental act, i.e., of a 
judgment, and therefore the unity or coherence of such a speech act is really the 
unity or coherence of the mental act that underlies it. This unity, we claim, is 
based on how the referential and predicable concepts of the subject and predicate 
expressions of such an act combine and function together. Such a combination 
and mutual functioning of referential and predicable concepts is what we mean 
here by predication. What we propose is to explain the unity of predication in 
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Nino B. Cocchiarella54
terms of a conceptualist theory of logical forms that represent referential and 
predicable concepts and that we believe explains at least some important aspects 
of thought and natural language. Our conceptualist logic also contains an account 
of plural and mass noun predication, i.e., of plural and mass noun reference and 
predication, the truth conditions of which are based on a logic of plurals and mass 
nouns that we have developed elsewhere.1
Concepts in this conceptualist theory are the intersubjective cognitive capaci-
ties humans acquire in learning a language and that subsequently come to underlie 
our use of language. Predicable concepts, in particular, are the cognitive capacities 
underlying our rule-following use of predicate expressions, and referential con-
cepts are the cognitive capacities underlying our rule-following use of referential 
expressions. As cognitive capacities, concepts are the basis of a kind of pragmatic 
knowledge, or more specifically a knowing how to do things with referential and 
predicable expressions in various contexts of use of language and thought. Having 
such concepts is not a form of propositional knowledge, i.e., knowledge that cer-
tain rules of language are correct, even though having such concepts underlies the 
rule-following behavior those rules might describe. As intersubjectively realizable 
cognitive capacities that might be exercised at the same time by different persons 
and at different times by the same person, referential and predicable concepts are 
in an appropriate sense objective cognitive universals.
According to Kant, what unifies a mental act is a “synthetic unity of appercepti-
on of the thinking subject”.2 Such an apperception, Kant claimed, not only unifies 
each judgment, but it also determines the categorial structure of the different 
possible judgments that can be made. In fact, according to Kant, what categories 
there are and how they fit together is determined by a “transcendental deduction”, 
and the categories so deduced form the basis of a so-called transcendental logic. 
But just how the synthetic unity of apperception unifies a judgment is not clear. 
Apparently, it is assumed that the unity is somehow determined by the mind of 
the thinker. The question then is just how does the mind do this? Is there a way 
we can logically represent this unity? We believe that the theory that we propose 
here for our conceptualist logic might possibly be taken as providing an answer 
to this last question, but in no sense do we claim that our logic is based on either 
a transcendental deduction or a synthetic unity of apperception.
Some philosophers claim that predication can be explained only in terms of 
a relation or “tie” of exemplification. Exemplification is said to be what holds 
1 See Cocchiarella (2002) and (2009).
2 Kant (1965, §16), “The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception”.
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together (and hence unifies) what the subject of a sentence denotes with what 
the predicate stands for, the result being a state of affairs or a proposition. For 
the sentence ‘Socrates is wise’, for example, exemplification is what relates or ties 
Socrates with wisdom. Wisdom of course is an abstract entity that does not exist 
in the world the way Socrates does (or did). That is, wisdom exists – or rather 
has being if existence applies only to things in the physical world – in some abs-
tract platonic realm. Exemplification, accordingly, is assumed to be a relation or 
“tie” between something concrete or physical and something abstract. Aside from 
the question of how there could be a such a relation or “tie” between objects of 
different realms or modes of being, this sort of answer does not explain how the 
referential and predicable concepts that are exercised in a judgment are unified in 
a speech or mental act. After all, a mental act, such as a judgment, does not have 
either a concrete object such as Socrates or an abstract object such as wisdom as 
a constituent. A relation of exemplification, in other words, is not what explains 
the unity of a speech or mental act.
Some other philosophers, including especially Gottlob Frege, would object 
to a relation of exemplification because it replaces the predicate phrase, e.g., ‘is 
wise’, by its nominalized form, ‘wisdom’, an objection with which we agree. The 
predicate phrase in ‘Socrates is wise’ does not function as a name, in other words, 
and that is because what the predicate stands for is not an object (or thing) that 
can be named. According to Frege, what a predicate stands for is an abstract un-
saturated function from objects to truth values, which Frege also called a concept, 
but not in the sense of a cognitive capacity. Instead of exemplification, what the 
sentence ‘Socrates is wise’ says is that Socrates falls under the abstract concept that 
the predicate stands for, i.e., the abstract function that ‘is wise’ stands for assigns 
truth to Socrates. This answer is also unsatisfactory, because as an abstract entity 
a Fregean concept is not a mind dependent entity, and therefore it has nothing to 
do with the unity of a mental act.
Finally, whether predication is explained in terms of exemplification or an 
abstract Fregean function from objects to truth values, many philosophers view 
the judgment that ‘Socrates is wise’ as expressing a belief, which is then assumed 
to be a relation between a person’s mind and a proposition (or state of affairs) 
having Socrates and the property of being wise as constituents. Be that as it may, 
such a view still does not account for the unity of the judgment as a speech or 
mental act, and therefore we will not be concerned with such a view here, whether 
positively or negatively.
These kinds of answers, and others like them, are semantical accounts of the 
truth conditions of a speech act, and in particular a speech act of rather simple 
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form where the subject is either a proper name or a definite description. None 
really explains (or purports to explain) what accounts for the unity of a speech 
or mental act. What these sorts of theories purport to explain are the truth con-
ditions of simple subject-predicate sentences, from which, supposedly, the truth 
conditions of other kinds of sentences are then determined as in a model-theoretic 
semantics. We do not dispute the importance of such an account of truth con-
ditions, but whatever the significance of this approach it does not explain the 
problem of the unity of a speech or mental act. We do assume, as far as truth 
conditions are concerned, that the logical forms of our conceptualist theory pro-
vide a perspicuous guide to what logically follows from what, and in that regard 
the theory provides all of the semantics that we need for our present purpose. In 
other words, we assume that the logical forms of our underlying logic carry their 
semantics on their sleeves.
1. General Reference and the Medieval Suppositio Doctrine
Subject expressions of natural language, and of English in particular, consist not 
only of proper names or definite descriptions, but also of quantifier phrases such 
as ‘Every republican who voted for the bill’ and ‘Some democrat who did not vote 
for the bill’. As subject expressions of speech acts, these quantifier phrases, are 
used to express different forms of general reference, and the unity of a speech act 
based on the use of such an expression must be accounted for no less so than those 
having a proper name or definite description as a referring subject expression. 
Our theory, in other words, must account for general reference as well as singular 
reference. Here again one must not confuse accounting for the truth conditions 
(as in standard model theory) of these general statements or judgments in terms 
of their instances with explaining their unity as speech acts or judgments. That 
in effect amounts to changing the subject.
Historically these kinds of speech and mental acts were taken seriously by 
medieval logicians and linguists, especially in the 14th c. They were explained 
primarily by the medieval suppositio (supposition) theory of William of Ockham, 
John Buridan, Walter Burley, Gregory of Rimini, and a number of others. Today 
this theory is generally called terminist logic because of its focus on the categore-
matic expressions of Latin that were called terms. As in our conceptualist theory, 
reference in terminist logic was a pragmatic notion, i.e., it was intended to apply 
to our speech and mental acts in different contexts of use.
One important part of suppositio theory is the doctrine of the modes of sup-
position. This doctrine, despite the reference to “modes” of supposition, is not a 
theory about different “ways of referring”. Rather, the “modes” are just different 
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 57
types and subtypes of personal supposition, which is reference to things. We have 
explained elsewhere how these different subtypes of personal supposition, and 
Ockham’s suppositio theory in general, can be reconstructed in terms of our con-
ceptualist theory of reference, and the details of that analysis will not be repeated 
here.3 Instead, we briefly consider the kind of language that was implicit in termi-
nist logic, and then in a later section discuss the terminist identity (or two-name) 
theory of the copula, which will be useful in our account of predication.
Implicit in terminist logic was the view that there is a language of thought that 
today is sometimes called Mental, a language that was made up of both categore-
matic and syncategorematic concepts.4 This mental language was assumed to be 
a “natural language” common to all humans and somehow established by nature. 
What makes Mental natural is that its categorematic concepts (mental terms) get 
their signification (reference) by nature and not by convention. The assumption 
was that there is a “natural likeness” between concepts and the things they signify 
(refer to), a likeness that was caused by the things signified.
Implicit in this theory was the idea that concepts are like images that resemble 
things, a view that is quite different from the kind of cognitive capacities that we 
take them to be in our form of conceptualism. For a variety of reasons that we 
will not go into here, this “imagist” theory is an inadequate account of concepts. 
One reason is that many of the concepts that are cognitive capacities in our form 
of conceptualism, such as the concepts we have in mathematics, and the various 
concepts we have about the microphysical world, can in no sense be said to have 
a likeness to things in nature.5 Otherwise than this sort of difference in the nature 
of concepts much of what the medieval philosophers and linguists have to say 
about Mental can be explained in terms of the logical framework of our form of 
conceptualism.
Mental is a tensed and modal language containing among its syncategorematic 
concepts certain operators that correspond to the tenses and modal modifications 
of verbs, or what the medieval logicians called ampliation. Our conceptualist 
logic includes these features and represents them as formula operators, but for 
convenience we will not deal with the details of tense and modal logic in this 
paper – except briefly later in order to deal with a specific problem regarding 
predication based on relations. Also, because of ampliation mental terms were 
taken to signify (refer) in a wider sense than just to (presently) existing things. In 
3 See Cocchiarella (2001). See also Spade (2007).
4 See, e.g., Geach (1980b), Normore (1990), and Trentman (1970). See also Scott (1966b).
5 For more on this difference between Mental and our form of conceptualism see Coc-
chiarella (2001, §2).
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Nino B. Cocchiarella58
other words, Mental was ontologically committed not just to present but also to 
past and future objects, and even possible objects. The possible objects that were 
signified (in the wider sense), however, seemed to be only those that are possible 
in nature.6 In our form of conceptualism we also allow for the kind of possibilia we 
believe to be implicit in natural language, but we distinguish the many concepts 
that entail existence such as dog, house, man, etc., and even dragon, from those 
that do not. In other words, something cannot be a dog, house, man, or a dragon 
unless it exists. But then we also distinguish fictional and mythological contexts 
from ordinary contexts of use, so that although no dragons exist in reality, some 
dragons exist in fiction.7
According to Geach, the “grammar of Mental turns out to be remarkably like 
Latin grammar”, and indeed Ockham did seem to carry over some of the features 
of Latin into Mental.8 But according to J. Trentman, “Ockham’s real criterion (…) 
for admitting grammatical distinctions into Mental amounted to asking whether 
the distinctions in question would be necessary in an ideal language – ideal for a 
complete, true description of the world”.9 Similarly, according to many medieval 
specialists, the proper comparison is not of Mental with Latin but of Mental with 
the kind of “ideal languages” that logicians and philosophers have constructed in 
the twentieth century, i.e., with the kind of logical system such as our conceptualist 
theory of logical form.
What is needed for an adequate interpretation of terminist logic is a represen-
tation of Mental as a logistic system, and in particular one based on a view of logic 
as language as opposed to logic as calculus. We take the logic of our conceptualist 
theory of predication to be just that sort of system. We turn now to the first part 
of our version of such a logic.
2. General Reference in the Logic of Names
The initial form of our theory of reference is called a logic of names, where by 
names we mean not just proper names but also common nouns, whether simple 
or complex, and even verbal nouns complex or simple. Verbal nouns are used to 
refer to events, as when we speak of a kissing, or a jumping, etc. For convenience 
6 See Normore (1985: 191). We note that a natural possibility and necessity seems to be 
what Burley had in mind.
7 See Cocchiarella (2013) for more on the distinction between existence-entailing con-
cepts and concepts that do not entail existence.
8 See Geach (1980b).
9 See Trentman (1970: 589).
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 59
we will not deal with verbal nouns in this paper. In regard to names otherwise than 
verbal nouns, we note that medieval terminist logicians held, as did Leśniewski 
in his logic of names (which he also called ontology), that the category of names 
includes common names, i.e., common nouns, as well as proper names. This is 
different from most views today where common names are taken as predicates 
and proper names, along with definite descriptions, are taken as singular terms, 
which is an entirely different category from predicates. Peter Geach, incidentally, 
changed his mind on this matter and came to agree with Leśniewski’s and our 
view of names. Geach, in other words, “came to accept the view of Leśniewski and 
other Polish logicians that there is no distinct category of proper names (….) in 
syntax there is only the category of names”.10
We take it that a basic form of judgment is expressed by an assertion that 
consists of a noun phrase and a verb phrase, and that the noun phrase has a refe-
rential role regardless whether or not it is a proper name, a definite description, or 
a quantifier phrase. A definite description is viewed in our theory as a quantifier 
phrase on a par with a universal or existential quantifier phrase.11
But because our first-order logic is free of existential presuppositions, a definite 
description may fail to refer to anything, as might the use of a proper name as well.
A quantifier phrase in our logic of names is made up of two parts, the first 
being a determiner such as ‘every’, ‘some’, the indefinite article ‘a’, and the definite 
article ‘the’ – and others as well, such as ‘most’, ‘few’, etc., which we will not deal 
with here. The second part of a quantifier phrase is a name in our present sense, 
which may be a proper name or a common name, i.e., a common noun, which 
could be a mass noun, a count noun, or a gerund in its role as a verbal noun (and 
which, as noted, we will not deal with here). A count noun can be simple, such 
as, e.g., ‘politician’, or complex, such as ‘politician who is conservative’, where the 
complexity is the result of affixing a qualifying relative clause, such as ‘who (or 
that, or which) is conservative’, to the head noun. Similarly, a mass noun can be 
simple, such as, e.g., ‘water’, or complex as with ‘water that is polluted’.
Our basic logic, which we call a logic of names, is an extension of free first-
order predicate logic with identity, i.e., first-order predicate logic free of existential 
presuppositions. The extension consists of adding a new syntactic category, which 
we call the category of names (in our present sense). The name variables of this 
category may be bound by either the universal or existential quantifiers. Name 
variables and constants are the simple names in this category. Complex names 
10 Geach (1980b: 15).
11 Evans held a similar view of definite descriptions in (1982: 57).
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Nino B. Cocchiarella60
are formed by means of a relative-clause operator. Leśniewski’s logic of names is 
different from ours, but, as we have shown in Cocchiarella (2001), Leśniewski’s 
logic of names is reducible to our logic of names, i.e., Leśniewski’s logic can be 
translated into our logic so that every theorem of his system is a theorem of ours.12
Our logic of names contains absolute (unrestricted) as well as restricted, rela-
tive quantifier phrases, i.e., relative quantifier phrases such as (∀xA) and (∃xA), 
read as ‘every A’ and ‘some A’, respectively, where A is a name, common or proper, 
and complex or simple.13 We will use the standard quantifier forms (∀x) and (∃y) 
for the absolute quantifier phrases. We use x, y, z, etc., with or without nume-
rical subscripts, as first-order variables and A, B, C, with or without numerical 
subscripts, as name variables. Complex names are formed by adjoining defining 
or restricting relative clauses to names. For our relative-clause operator we use ‘/’, 
as in A/x, to represent the adjunction of a formula x to the name A (which may 
itself be complex). We read A/x as ‘A that is x’. Thus, e.g., the quantifier phrase 
representing reference to a brown dog can be symbolized as (∃xDog/Brown(x)). 
We assume that an attributive adjective, such as ‘brown’ in ‘brown dog’, is equi-
valent to its occurrence as a predicate in a relative clause, as in ‘dog that is brown’. 
Attributive adjectives such as ‘alleged’ in ‘alleged thief ’ are really operators, as in 
‘person who is alleged to be a thief ’, where ‘alleged’ would be symbolized as the 
operator ‘it is alleged that’.14 A relative clause might itself be complex, of course, 
which is then represented by an iteration of the operator /. The complex quanti-
fier phrase ‘a brown dog that is vicious’, for example, can then be represented as 
(∃xDog/Brown(x)/Vicious(x)).
A proper name, such as ‘Gina’, for example, can occur in our logic as part of a 
quantifier phrase, as in (∃xGina)F(x), which indicates that the name ‘Gina’ is being 
used with existential presupposition. In our logic of plurals (and mass nouns), which 
we describe later as an extension of our logic of names, all names, proper or com-
mon, can be transformed into “terms”, i.e., arguments of predicates, and one result 
of such a transformation is that the formula (∃xGina)F(x) turns out to be equivalent 
12 See Cocchiarella (2001) for a proof of this reduction.
13 Absolute quantifiers will range over not just every object or thing, but every plurality as 
well, or what later we will call classes as many. As we note later, this will include what 
mass nouns denote as well.
14 Some attributive adjectives such as ‘big’ and ‘small’, as in ‘big mouse’ and ‘small ele-
phant’ have an analysis more involved than as simple predicate adjectives; but we will 
not deal with those adjectives here.
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 61
to the more standard free-logic expression.15 Thus whereas (∃xGina)F(x) represents 
the referential role of the name ‘Gina’ in a speech act, the formula (∃x)[x = Gina ∧ 
F(x)] represents the truth conditions and logical implications of that speech act.
As already noted, definite descriptions are also quantifier phrases in this logic 
no less so than indefinite descriptions. As quantifier phrases, both definite and 
indefinite descriptions can be used as referential expressions, though of course 
they differ logically (and therefore semantically) in their referential roles. Definite 
descriptions, as indicated, can also be used with or without existential presup-
position. We will use ∃1 for the definite description operator when it is used 
with a presupposition and ∀1 when without. Our analysis of a use of ∃1 agrees in 
essentials with Bertrand Russell’s contextual analysis of definite descriptions. We 
symbolize ‘The A is F ’ as (∃1xA)F(x) when ‘The A’ is used with existential presup-
position, and as (∀1xA)F(x) when used without.16 Thus, e.g., an assertion of ‘The 
black dog is vicious’, where the definite description is being used with existential 
presupposition is symbolized as:
(∃1xDog/Black(x))Vicious(x),
which represents the form of the speech act, whereas
(∃xDog/Black(x))[(∀yDog/Black(y))(y = x) ∧ Vicious(x)]
gives a more perspicuous representation of its truth conditions. Applying meaning 
postulates about how relative clauses and relative quantifiers are to be expanded, 
this last can be further expanded as follows:17
(∃x)[( ∃yDog)(x = y) ∧ Black(x) ∧ (∀z)(( ∃yDog)(z = y) ∧ 
Black(z) → z = x) ∧ Vicious(x)].
15 This use of “term” should be distinguished from what the medieval logicians meant by 
a term.
16 The truth conditions of these formulas are given more perspicuously as,
(∃1xA)F(x) ↔ (∃xA)[(∀yA)(y = x) ∧ F(x)],
for situations where the definite description is used with existential presupposition, 
and as
(∀1xA)F(x) ↔ (∀xA)[(∀yA)(y = x) → F(x)]
 where used without.
17 The meaning postulates in question here are as follows:
(∀xA/F(x))G(x) ↔ (∀x)[(∃yA)(x = y) ∧ F(x) → G(x)]
 and
(∃xA/F(x))G(x) ↔ (∃x)[(∃yA)(x = y) ∧ F(x) ∧ G(x)].
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Nino B. Cocchiarella62
This formula gives even more details about the truth conditions in question. But 
these are matters about the background logic and truth conditions of our speech 
and mental acts, as opposed to the logical forms of our speech or mental acts 
themselves as described in terms of the referential and predicable concepts being 
exercised. In other words, the first of the above formulas represents the logical 
form of the speech act in question, namely the assertion that the black dog is vi-
cious, whereas the last provides a more perspicuous representation of its logical 
form with respect to its deductive implications, and therefore its truth conditions 
as well. This distinction between the logical forms that represent the mental or 
speech-act level and the logical forms that represent the deductive truth-condi-
tional level is a fundamental feature of our conceptual logic, and it is important 
that it be kept in mind in understanding how this theory works.
Finally, we should note that Dog is not a predicate in our logic but a common 
name, and Dog(x) is neither well-formed nor the proper way to symbolize the 
statement that x is a dog. Instead we use (∃yDog)(x = y) to say that x is a dog. The 
indefinite article is both retained and represented in our account, which is as it 
should be in a representation of our speech acts.
3. On the Unsaturated Nature of Concepts
Now what quantifier phrases stand for as noun phrases in the subject positions of 
our speech acts are referential concepts, and of course what predicate expressions 
stand for in such acts are predicable concepts. What unifies the speech act, and 
the underlying mental act, is the joint exercise of a referential and a predicable 
concept. As intersubjectively realizable cognitive capacities, these concepts have 
an unsaturated nature each complementary to the other, so that when exercised 
each saturates the other in a kind of mental chemistry resulting in a speech or 
mental act. The mutual saturation corresponds to what Gottlob Frege described 
as a first-level concept falling within a second-level concept, which is appropriately 
represented by the adjunction of a quantifier phrase with a predicate expression. 
We note that even though falling within is not same as falling under, i.e., where an 
object is said to fall under a first-level concept, nevertheless, according to Frege, 
both an object falling under a first-level concept, and a first-level concept falling 
within a second-level concept result in a truth value. That, however, is not how 
we understand the unsaturated nature of referential and predicable concepts.
In particular, as cognitive capacities, a referential and predicable concept, when 
exercised together in a speech or mental act, result in an event, not a truth value. 
The event may be just a mental event, e.g., a judgment, if it is not overtly expressed, 
or a speech act event as well if it is overtly expressed. The exercise of a referential 
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 63
concept informs the event with a referential, directed nature (or what Brentano 
and Husserl called a presentation18), and the exercise of a predicable concept in-
forms the event with a predicable nature.
The unsaturated nature of referential and predicable concepts as cognitive ca-
pacities is radically different from the unsaturated nature of Frege’s concepts. 
Frege’s notion of a concept is that of an abstract function from objects to truth va-
lues, which means that it is nothing at all like a cognitive capacity. The unsaturated 
nature of concepts as cognitive capacities, on the other hand, is analogous to the 
nature of dispositional properties that real, non-abstract things might have, except 
that dispositions have a “were-would” nature, whereas cognitive capacities have 
a “were-could” nature. That is, if something has a dispositional property (such 
as solubility in water), then if it were in a certain context or placed under certain 
circumstances, then that thing would have a related but different property (such 
as being dissolved in water), whereas if a speaker were in an appropriate linguistic 
or mental context to apply a given concept, then that speaker could, but might not, 
exercise that concept in that context. This quasi-dispositional nature of concepts as 
cognitive capacities explains how concepts, unlike the momentary image-concepts 
of the medieval suppositio theory, can continue to exist as capacities even when 
they are not being exercised – just as dispositional properties somehow exist in 
nature even when they are not being manifested. It also explains how the same 
concept as an intersubjectively realizable rule-following cognitive capacity can be 
possessed, and exercised, by different people at the same time, as well as by the 
same person at different times. The unsaturated nature of concepts as cognitive 
capacities is a natural property that concepts have, and therefore, unlike Frege’s 
notion, it is not part of an abstract ontology. Also, as the cognitive capacities 
underlying our rule-following abilities in the use of referential and predicable 
expressions, concepts have a certain kind of functionality different from Frege’s 
abstract notion, specifically in how they are exercised and function in speech and 
thought. This kind of functionality explains their complementarity, i.e., how they 
mutually saturate each other in thought and speech.19
The exercise of a referential concept informs a speech or mental act (an event) 
with a referential nature, just as the predicable concept jointly exercised with 
18 For a formal representation of Brentano’s notion of a presentation in terms of the 
present logic of names see Cocchiarella (2013).
19 We do not claim that the unsaturated nature of concepts as cognitive capacities are 
irreducible to neurophysiological properties of the brain. As with the dispositional 
properties of physical objects, the issue of reducibility to occurrent states or properties 
remains controversial.
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Nino B. Cocchiarella64
that referential concept informs that act with a predicable nature. Thus, every 
affirmative assertion that is syntactically analyzable in terms of a subject phrase 
and a predicate phrase (regardless of the complexity of either) is semantically 
analyzable in terms of an overt exercise of a referential concept with a predicable 
concept – and the assertion itself, as an event, is just the mutual saturation of their 
complementary structures in that speech act.
4. Nominalization and Relational Predication
We now extend our free first-order logic of names to a second-order predicate 
logic in which predicate expressions can be nominalized and occur as arguments 
of predicates, including of themselves. Given certain constraints that we will not 
go into here, Russell’s paradox is not forthcoming, and the result is provably equi-
valent to the theory of simple types.20 Predicate variables and quantifiers binding 
such are of course part of the logic. We will use the same symbol for the nomi-
nalized form of a predicate variable or constant. But when a predicate variable or 
constant occurs in its predicative role (along with one or more arguments), then 
it must have a pair of accompanying parentheses, as in F(x) or G(z, y), whereas 
the parentheses are deleted when the variable or constant occurs as a term or 
argument of a predicate, as, e.g., in G(z, F), where G occurs as a predicate with its 
parentheses and F occurs as a term without parentheses.21 We use the variable-
binding λ-operator to represent complex predicates, as in the Russell predicate, 
[λx(∃F)(F = x ∧ ¬F(x))], which is read as ‘to be a concept that does not fall under 
itself ’, and which qua predicate expression stands for a predicable concept, i.e., a 
value of the bound (one-place) predicate variables, but which when nominalized 
does not denote a value of the bound first-order variables of our free first-order 
logic, because otherwise the paradox would be generated. In reasoning and trying 
to derive a contradiction on the basis of the Russell predicate we must know how 
to use the predicate, which means that the predicable concept for which it stands 
must exist as a cognitive capacity, otherwise we would not be able to reason with 
it. It does not mean, on the other hand, that the intensional content of the concept 
can be “objectified”, i.e., exist as a value of the bound first-order variables.
What nominalized predicate expressions denote (when they in fact denote) are 
the intensions (or intensional contents) of the concepts (cognitive capacities) they 
stand for in their role as predicates. These intensions can be informally identified 
20 See chapters 5 and 6 of Cocchiarella (1986), or §4.5 of Cocchiarella of (2007).
21 Our use of ‘term’ here should not be confused with what medieval logicians called 
terms.
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 65
with the functions from possible contexts of use of the predicates to the extensions 
of the concepts the predicates stand for in those contexts. They cannot of course 
be the concepts themselves, because as unsaturated cognitive concepts, the latter 
cannot be taken as values of the bound first-order variables. When a nominalized 
predicate occurs in a formula, we say that the concept the predicate stands for 
as a cognitive capacity has been deactivated (with respect to the nominalized 
occurrence of the predicate). It is deactivated of course because it is no longer 
functioning in that occurrence as a predicate.
One important use of nominalized predicates is for their occurrence as direct 
objects of intensional verbs, as in ‘Jim wants to be president’, which we can sym-
bolize as:
(∃xJim)Wants(x, [λyPresident(y)]),
where the nominalized predicate [λyPresident(y)] is read as the infinitive phrase 
‘to be president’. We should note that the above predication, as well as all of the pre-
dications based on a relation discussed in this chapter, could (and perhaps should) 
be formulated in terms of a (complex) monadic predication as a λ-abstract. That 
would make it clear that what appears to be a relational predication is really a com-
plex form of monadic predication, i.e., where predication is explained in terms of 
the mutual saturation of a referential concept and a monadic predicable concept. 
Thus, e.g., in the case now being discussed, we could (and perhaps should) sym-
bolize the above sentence as:
(∃xJim)[λxWants(x, [λyPresident(y)])](x).
We avoid doing so here mainly for simplicity and convenience of expression. 
Our point remains that predication is the mutual saturation of a referential and 
a (monadic) predicable concept even when the predicate expression is a complex 
based on a relation. We should note here, incidentally, that as a cognitive capacity 
a predicable concept, and similarly a referential concept, is not assumed to have a 
complex structure corresponding to the predicate, or referential expression, whose 
use it underlies – as might well be the case in a realist theory of predication about 
properties and properties of properties.22
In the above example we are not using ‘is president’ as a predicate. The 
predicate has been nominalized, indicating that the concept it stands for has 
been deactivated. Our view that a nominalized predicate occurring as direct 
22 Properties of properties are what quantifier phrases stand for in a realist theory of 
predication.
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Nino B. Cocchiarella66
(or indirect) object of a relational verb in a speech act denotes the intension 
of that predicate is similar to Richard Montague’s view that such an occur-
rence is to be taken as denoting the sense of the predicate.23 Montague gave 
this sort of analysis for the direct objects of all relations, whether or not those 
relations were intensional or extensional. That was an important insight espe-
cially with respect to how we should analyze direct (or indirect) objects that 
contain quantifier phrases. We will adopt the same strategy here for speech or 
mental acts, except that, instead of denoting the sense of a predicate occurring 
as the direct (or indirect) object, we take the occurrence of the predicate to 
be deactivated, which means that it is nominalized and denotes its intension 
instead.24
Thus, consider Montague’s example of ‘Jim wants to find a unicorn’, which is 
symbolized as:
(∃xJim)Wants(x, [λy(∃zUnicorn)Finds(y, z)]).
Here the nominalized (complex) predicate [λy(∃zUnicorn)Finds(y, z)] is read 
as ‘to be a y such that y finds a unicorn’, and here again on our view the predi-
cate ‘finds a unicorn’ has been deactivated and is not being used to predicate 
finding a unicorn of anyone. The phrase ‘a unicorn’ occurs in this context as 
a quantifier phrase, but because it occurs within a deactivated predicate it is 
then understood as being itself deactivated, and hence as representing a deac-
tivated referential concept. In other words, there is no reference to a unicorn 
in this example.
Now we do sometimes represent a quantifier phrase as being directly and not 
indirectly deactivated and hence occurring as a term of a complex predicate. The 
example Montague considered for his sense-denotation type theory was ‘John 
seeks a unicorn’, where the quantifier phrase ‘a unicorn’ is the direct object of 
‘seeks’. Instead of dealing with the sense of the quantifier phrase ‘a unicorn’ as in 
Montague’s theory, we nominalize or deactivate it by first correlating the phrase 
with a predicate as follows:
[∃xUnicorn] =df [λy(∃G)(y = G ∧ (∃xUnicorn)G(x))],
23 See Montague (1970).
24 The difference between senses and intensions can be important, as in Montague’s the-
ory, or not, as in our theory, where much depends on how fine-grained an analysis is 
given to intensions. In our theory much depends on how we understand a context of 
use of language.
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 67
and then we nominalize or deactivate the predicate.25 Here the predicate in ques-
tion can be read as ‘to be a concept under which a unicorn falls’. The intension of 
this predicate is what we take as the intension of the quantifier phrase ‘a unicorn’.
The sentence ‘John seeks a unicorn’ can then be symbolized as follows:
(∃yJohn)Seeks(y, [∃xUnicorn]).
A similar analysis applies to ‘John fi nds a unicorn’ as well:
(∃yJohn)Finds(y, [∃xUnicorn]),
which means that both sentences are analyzed as having the same logical form. 
In both cases we have interpreted the quantifier phrase ‘a unicorn’ as being no-
minalized, in which case we say that the referential concept it stands for has been 
deactivated, i.e., we are not here actively referring to a unicorn.
Now although these two sentences have the same logical form, there is a diffe-
rence in the content of the predicate in each. In particular, whereas the predicate 
Find is extensional, the predicate Seek is not. Thus, given the extensionality of 
Find, we have as a meaning postulate:
[λyFinds(y, [∃xA])] = [λy(∃xA)Finds(y, x)],
where A is a name variable. What the meaning postulate stipulates here is that ‘to 
be a y such that y finds an A’ is ‘to be a y such that some A is such that y finds it’. 
From this meaning postulate it follows that there is a unicorn that John finds.26 
The same cannot be said for Seek, on the other hand, because Seek is an intensional 
and not an extensional verb. In this way we are able to give the same sort analysis 
that Montague gave in his treatment of quantifier phrases in English, but without 
having to resort to Montague’s sense-denotation type theory.
25 The generalized schema for a “nominalized” quantifier phrase is:
  [QxA] =df [λy(∃G)(y = G ∧ (QxA)G(x))],
 where A is a name variable and Q is a quantifier. Note that when nominalizing a quan-
tifier phrase we replace the parentheses that normally occur as part of the phrase with 
brackets.
26 This meaning postulate is of course an instance of the more schematic form:
  [λyFinds(y, [QxA])] = [λy(QxA)Finds(y, x)],
which can be applied to ‘finds a few books’, ‘finds most books’, etc.
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Nino B. Cocchiarella68
5. Nominalization with Formula Operators
Now there is a problem with both Montague’s and our analysis of a (complex) 
predication based on a relation with a quantifier phrase as direct object. Consider, 
e.g., the sentence ‘Jim bought and ate an apple’, the truth conditions of which can
be symbolized as:
(∃xJim)(∃yApple)(Bought(x, y) ∧ Ate(x, y)).
As a speech or mental act, however, this won’t do because of the double quantifier 
phrase. That is, as a speech or mental act what we have on this analysis are two 
active referential concepts, whereas in fact there is only one active reference in 
the assertion, namely to Jim.
We could try the following analysis in which the quantifier phrase ‘an apple’ 
has been nominalized and therefore deactivated:
(∃xJim)[λx[λy(Bought(x, y) ∧ Ate(x, y))]([∃yApple])](x).
This analysis will not do as well, however, because by λ-conversion and the exten-
sionality of Bought and Ate, it is equivalent to ‘Jim bought an apple and Jim ate an 
apple’, which is not equivalent to the original sentence, because on this analysis 
the apple he bought might be different from the apple he ate.
I have made several proposals elsewhere as to how to answer this problem in 
our conceptualist logic.27 We will not review those proposals here, but I want to 
suggest a new, different proposal that is based on an issue regarding how to inter-
pret tense and modal operators – and probably formula operators in general – in 
our speech or mental acts. I think this proposal works best for the example we are 
considering here, at least for our conceptualist logic even if not also for Montague’s 
sense-denotation type-theoretical view.
Consider, for example, the denial that the round square is round, which, using 
the negation sign for the formula operator ‘it is not the case’, we can symbolize as
¬(∃1xSquare/Round(x))Round(x).
Here, of course, we are not referring to a square that is round. Nor of course are 
we predicating of the round square that it is not round (as Alexis Meinong would 
have it). Rather we are denying or rejecting the proposition that the round square 
is round. One way to read this is as ‘That the round square is round is not the 
case’, i.e., to understand the operator as a predicate, so that the above can also be 
symbolized as:
27 See Cocchiarella (2007, chapter 7.8).
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 69
Not([∃1xSquare/Round(x))Round(x)]),
where the bracketed formula is read as the nominalized form of the indicated 
sentence and Not is taken as a predicate. Here we represent the nominalization 
of a formula by bracketing it. Predication, needless to say, is not activated in a 
nominalized sentence. Nor of course is reference, i.e., there is no active reference 
to a round square in this denial.28 What a nominalized sentence denotes in our 
conceptualist logic is the intension of the sentence.
Now the point to our proposal is that the same kind of analysis applies to tense 
and modal operators, and in particular to the operator Ƥ for ‘it was the case’, so 
that ‘It was the case that ’, where  is a formula can be symbolized as Ƥ, but 
understood as Was([]), i.e., as ‘that  was the case’. Thus, when we assert the 
sentence ‘That there is a king of France was the case’, we are not actively referring 
to a king of France; rather we are only asserting that the proposition in question 
was the case or true in the past.
Why bring in the past-tense operator here when tense operators and their lo-
gic have been left as implicit in the background logic? The answer is because the 
predicate ‘bought and ate’ is in the past tense and really contains an implicit tense 
operator such as in ‘x bought an apple and then ate it’, which can be symbolized as:
Ƥ(∃yApple)(ƤBuys(x, y) ∧ Eats(x, y)),
where Ƥ(∃yA)(Ƥ ∧ ) can be read as ‘That (∃yA)( and then ) was the case’. 
The ‘and-then’, in other words, can be defined in terms of the past-tense operator 
as indicated.29 Notice that because the apple was eaten and hence no longer exists, 
we are not here (now) referring to an apple. The formula following the tense ope-
rator is to be interpreted as deactivated, in other words. The original sentence ‘Jim 
bought and ate an apple’ can now be symbolized as:
(∃xJim)[λx Ƥ(∃yApple)( ƤBuys(x, y) ∧ Eats(x, y))](x),
and although the quantifier phrase ‘an apple’ has not been nominalized in this 
formula, nevertheless, because of the past-tense context, the referential concept 
it stands for has been deactivated.
28 If we were to use this notation, we would need to add a meaning postulate connecting it 
to the standard notation so that we can engage in the usual deductions in the standard 
way. For convenience, we choose not to bother with introducing the new notation.
29 See Prior (1967:182). Prior did not use the ‘and-then’ operator for the purpose we are 
proposing here, however.
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Nino B. Cocchiarella70
6. The Identity (Two-Name) Theory of the Copula
The idea that the direct (or indirect) object of a relational predicate is deactivated 
in a speech or mental act applies no less so to the copula in its use as a relational 
predicate than it does to transitive verbs such as ‘seek’ and ‘find’. In addition, this 
application to the copula is quite useful in our analysis of predication.
Now the medieval terminist logicians and linguists interpreted the copula as 
an identity, a view that most modern philosophers and linguists reject, but that 
is because the terminist logicians took the copula to be no less than predication 
itself (for categorical sentences). On our view, however, taking the copula as pre-
dication is no more correct than taking any relation (such as ‘seek’ or ‘find’) as a 
form of predication, which does not mean that it cannot be the relational basis of 
a complex monadic predication.
We will use the expression ‘Is’ to represent the copula as a two-place predicate, 
and we note that, like the transitive verb ‘find’, the copula Is is extensional. Our 
meaning postulate in this regard transforms the copula into a strict identity. With 
a nominalized quantifier phrase as the direct object of the copula, the schematic 
meaning postulate for Is is as follows:
[λxIs(x, [∃yA])] = [λx(∃yA)(x = y)],
where A is a name variable. Thus, an assertion of the sentence ‘Jan is a teacher’ 
can now be symbolized as:
(∃xJan)Is(x, [∃yTeacher]),
which, by our meaning postulate regarding the extensionality of the copula, is 
equivalent to:
(∃xJan)(∃yTeacher)(x = y),
which is a more perspicuous representation of its truth conditions. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind here that the predicate in the speech act that Jan is a teacher 
is [λxIs(x, [∃yTeacher])], and not the copula or the identity sign itself. In other 
words, it is the predicable concept that this predicate stands for that is exercised 
in the speech act in question (and mutually saturated by the referential concept 
regarding Jan), and not the relational (identity) concept that Is stands for. As 
already noted, we have avoided writing out the λ-abstract throughout only for 
convenience.
It was something like the above sort of analysis that came to be called the two-
name, or identity, theory of the copula in terminist logic. Apparently, Ockham and 
other terminists thought that every affirmative categorical proposition amounted 
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 71
to asserting an identity between the personal suppositions of the subject and pre-
dicate terms of the proposition, as, e.g., the suppositions of the names ‘Jan’ and 
‘teacher’ in an assertion of ‘Jan is a teacher’. A negative judgment was construed 
as a denial of such an identity. As a result, the identity theory of the copula came 
to be developed as a theory of the truth conditions of categorical propositions, a 
theory that is now referred to as the doctrine of supposition proper.30
Consider, for example, an assertion of ‘Every whale is a mammal’. On our 
analysis this sentence has the logical form,
(∀xWhale)Is(x, [∃yMammal]),
which, by the meaning postulate for Is, reduces to:
(∀xWhale)(∃yMammal)(x = y).
What this means in terminist logic is that each supposition of the categorical 
term ‘whale’ and some supposition of the categorical term ‘mammal’ are identical.
The terminists also understood categorical propositions with a predicate ad-
jective as being based on the ‘is’ of identity as well. Thus although an assertion of 
‘Every raven is black’ is represented in our logic by
(∀xRaven)Black(x),
this does not mean (as some philosophers have thought) that the terminists in-
terpreted the sentence as an identity between ravens and black, or blackness, or 
separate blacknesses for different ravens. Rather, the predicate adjective ‘black’ 
was interpreted as an attributive adjective, so that to say a thing is black is to say 
that it is a black thing.31 Predicate adjectives, in other words, were analyzed by the 
terminists as attributive adjectives applied to the common name ‘thing’, which is 
the opposite of our view that attributive adjectives are to be analyzed as predicate 
adjectives in relative clauses. But, as already noted, the common name ‘black 
thing’ is equivalent to the complex common name ‘thing that is black’, which is 
symbolized in our system as ‘Thing/Black(x)’. Thus, whereas the terminist logici-
an would interpret ‘Every raven is black’ as ‘Every raven is a black thing’, we can 
represent the terminists’ analysis as ‘Every raven is a thing that is black’ as follows:
(∀xRaven)Is(x, [∃yThing/Black(y)]),
which, by our meaning postulate for Is, is equivalent to
30 See Scott (1966a: 30).
31 See Normore (1985: 194).
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Nino B. Cocchiarella72
(∀xRaven)(∃yThing/Black(y))(x = y),
which, by our meaning postulates for the relative clause operator, reduces in logic 
to the above formula with ‘black’ as a predicate adjective. What this shows is that 
we have not really escaped the predication of ‘is black’ by ‘thing that is black’, 
since the occurrence of ‘is black’ now occurs in the relative clause, and a repeat 
of the analysis would only go on in an infinite regress to ‘thing that is a thing that 
is … a thing that is …’. In the end we must ground the predication in terms of the 
mutual saturation of a referential concept such as is expressed by ‘Every raven’ 
and a predicable concept such as is expressed by ‘is black’.
Negative categorical sentences such as ‘No whale is a fish’ were interpreted by 
the terminists as denials or negations. That is, to assert that no whale is a fish is 
to deny that some whale is a fish:
¬(∃xWhale)Is(x, [∃yFish]),
which, by the meaning postulate for Is reduces to
¬(∃xWhale)(∃yFish)Is(x, y),
and which for the terminists amounted to a denial that some supposition of the 
name ‘whale’ is identical with a supposition of the name ‘fish’.
Finally, let us turn to the logical form of a negative particular categorical sen-
tence such as ‘Some raven is not black’. This sentence can be symbolized with a 
λ-abstract as follows:
(∃xRaven)[λx¬Black(x)](x).
Our use of the λ-abstract here is so as to emphasize that the negation is an internal 
part of the predicate. This sentence would be understood in terminist logic as the 
statement that ‘some raven is not a black thing’, which is symbolized as
(∃xRaven)[λx¬Is(x, [∃yThing/Black(x)])](x).
This last formula, by λ-conversion and the meaning postulate for Is, is equivalent to
(∃xRaven)(∀yThing/Black(x))(x ≠ y),
the truth conditions for which are that some supposition of the common name 
‘raven’ is not identical with any supposition of the complex common name ‘thing 
that is black’.
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 73
We will not go on with further examples of the terminists’ two-name or identity 
theory of the copula.32 It is important to note here, however, that the idea of the 
copula as an identity is not wrong, but it needs to be seen as restricted to contexts 
with a quantifier phrase occurring as the direct object of the copula, and even 
then, it is to be understood as the basis of a complex relational predicate. This 
applies even when the copula is between two proper names, as in ‘Cicero is Tully’, 
which can symbolized as:
(∃xCicero)[λxIs(x, [∃yTully])](x),
but which – once names can be transformed into terms (in the extended logic 
that is to follow) – is equivalent to:
Cicero = Tully.
The important thing is to distinguish here the difference between the logical form 
that represents the speech act as based on a referential and predicable concept 
and the logical form that perspicuously represents its deductive role and hence its 
truth conditions (which in this case is the deductive logic of identity).
7. Plural Reference and Predication
We now turn to an analysis of plural reference and predication. As we will see, our 
account of the unity of predication in a speech or mental act applies no less so to 
plural reference and predication – and also to mass noun reference and predica-
tion – than to singular reference and predication. Both plural and singular predi-
cation, we maintain, are categorially on a par, i.e., there is no category difference 
or difference of level in English between singular and plural predication the way 
there is between subjects and predicates, though that is not how some philoso-
phers represent the situation.33 Plural reference will of course be to pluralities, and 
pluralities will be what plural predication is about. What we need accordingly are 
logical forms that represent pluralities, and along with such forms a logic of the 
truth conditions of our references to, and predications of, pluralities.
Now it should be noted that our treatment of names, proper or common, is 
not restricted to count nouns. That is so because the logic we have developed for 
count nouns applies to mass nouns as well. One important move in developing a 
logic for both plurals and mass nouns is to allow the common names that have so 
32 See Cocchiarella (2001) for more examples.
33 Boolos (1986), e.g., takes second-order predicate logic to be the logic of plurals, and 
others such as MacKay (2006) take it to be a totally new syntactic category.
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Nino B. Cocchiarella74
far occurred exclusively as parts of quantifier phrases to occur also as “terms” or 
arguments of predicates, i.e., as denoting expressions on a par with the variables 
of first-order logic. That of course is exactly how proper names in particular are 
normally represented in standard logic; but our point is that the same is to be done 
with common names as well (which is essentially the way they are understood in 
Leśniewski’s logic of names). And when such a common name is a count noun and 
occurs as an argument of a predicate then it is understood to denote a plurality 
(unless it denotes nothing).
In other words, we will allow for the nominalization or transformation of all 
names, proper or common, into “terms”, i.e., expressions that can occur as argu-
ments of predicates (the way the variables of first-order logic do).34 But for now 
we will restrict our attention to count nouns. When a count noun such as ‘man’ 
is nominalized in the manner indicated, what we get in English is the plural ‘men’ 
or the noun ‘mankind’ as when we say that Socrates is a member of mankind, not 
meaning that Socrates is a member of the set of people, but only that he is one 
among men (or people). Being one among, or being a member of, a collective or 
group such as mankind does not mean being a member of a set. Membership has 
a meaning or use in contexts about pluralities as collectives other than sets, and it 
is that use that we are concerned with here. In addition to “nominalized” names, 
proper or common, conjunctions of names, as in ‘George, Harry and Jim’, are also 
taken to denote pluralities, or collective groups, as for example in the statement 
that Russell and Whitehead are the coauthors of Principia Mathematica, or that 
George, Harry, and Jim are playing cards (together).
Now because names, proper or common, and complex or simple, can be 
transformed into arguments of predicates, i.e., into terms, we need to add to 
our logic a variable-binding operator that generates complex names the way that 
the λ-operator generates complex predicates. We will use the cap-notation with 
brackets, [x̂A/…x…], for this purpose. Accordingly, where A is a name, proper or 
common and complex or simple, we take [x̂A] to be a complex name, but one in 
which the variable x is bound. Thus where A is a name and  is a formula, [x̂A], 
[x̂A/], and [x̂/] are names in which all of the free occurrences of x are bound. 
We read these expressions as:
[x̂A] is read as ‘(the) A things’,
34 To be a term in this logic is not the same as to be a singular term, i.e., a term that denotes 
at most one single object or thing. Pluralities in particular will be denoted by terms 
and so will the various parts of what mass nouns denote. By a term we mean only an 
expression that can occur as an argument of predicates.
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 75
[x̂A/] is read as ‘(the) A things that are ’, and 
[x̂/] is read as ‘(the) things that are ’.
Thus for example, the conjunction of ‘George, Harry, and Jim’ can be represented 
by [x̂/x = George ∨ x = Harry ∨ x = Jim], which is read ‘the things that are either 
George, Harry, or Jim’. Usually, though, it is just read as a conjunction of names, 
as in ‘George, Harry and Jim are playing poker’.
Now we assume that in a given speech context we can distinguish the common 
names that represent count nouns from those that represent mass nouns. We do 
not assume, on the other hand, that there is an absolute, fixed distinction between 
count and mass nouns, but only that we can make such a distinction in particular 
contexts of use of language.35 Plural reference in English, of course, involves only 
count nouns.
In regard to the logical forms for plural reference and predication, we extend 
the inductive definition of the meaningful (well-formed) expressions of our con-
ceptualist logic to include the following clauses:
(1) if A represents a common count noun (in a given context), then AP is a plural
name (in that context);
(2) if A represents a common count noun (in a given context), x is a first-order
variable, and x is a formula, then [x̂A/x]P and [x̂/x]P are plural names (in
that context);
(3) if A/(x) represents a (complex) common count noun (in a given context),
then (A/x)P is AP/[λxx]P(x) and [x̂A/x]P is [x̂A P/[λxx]P(x)];
(4) if F is a one-place predicate constant, or of the form [λx(x)], then FP is a
one-place plural predicate constant; and
(5) if AP is a plural name (in a given context), x is a first-order variable, and  is
a formula, then (∀xAP) and (∃xAP) are formulas.
We read ‘(∀xManP)’ as the plural phrase ‘all men’ and ‘(∃xManP)’ as the plural 
phrase ‘some men’. In other words we take these phrases as representing plural 
referential concepts. Similarly, we read the complex predicate [λx(∃yMan)(x = y)]P 
as the plural predicate ‘men’. We note that a plural name is not a name simpliciter, 
and hence a plural name does not occur as a term or argument of predicates. That 
role is already filled by nominalized names simpliciter. That is the main difference 
here between plural names and names simpliciter: plural names do not occur as 
terms in our basic logical forms, which means that plural names occur only in 
35 See, e.g., Pelletier (1975: 456), regarding the notion of a “universal grinder” that can 
change a count noun into a mass noun in a given context.
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Nino B. Cocchiarella76
the logical forms that represent our speech or mental acts, and in particular as 
plural predicates in plural predication or as part of plural quantifier phrases in 
plural reference. Finally, it is important to note that we use meaning postulates 
to connect the logical forms of our speech or mental acts with the logical forms 
that give a more perspicuous representation of the deductive implications of our 
speech or mental acts, and hence of their truth conditions.
We note that only monadic predicates are pluralized. A two-place relation R 
can be pluralized in either its first- or second-argument position, or even in both, 
by using a λ-abstract, as, e.g.,
[λxR(x,y)]P,
[λyR(x,y)]P, 
[λx[λy[R(x,y)]P(y)](x)]P,
respectively; and a similar observation applies to n-place predicates for n> 2.
In turning to examples of plural reference and predication, let us consider the 
sentence ‘Whales are mammals’, where of course by ‘whales’ we mean ‘all whales’. 
As a thought or speech act, the sentence can be symbolized as follows: 
(∀xWhaleP)MammalP(x).
This formula of course should be equivalent to ‘Every whale is a mammal’, a state-
ment that involves only singular predication. In fact, the equivalence is provable 
in the logic we describe below. It is based on the same logical considerations given 
for ‘All men are mortal’ being equivalent to ‘Every man is mortal’ described below.
For an example that is not reducible to singular predication, consider the state-
ment that some men are playing poker (together), which we can symbolize as 
follows:
(∃xManP)Playing-pokerP(x).
Playing-poker is interpreted here as plural because the men are playing poker 
together. To be sure, if some men are playing poker (together), then some man, 
e.g., George, is playing poker, where ‘playing poker’ is now in the singular. But
playing poker together, i.e., where ‘playing poker’ is pluralized, is not a distributive 
predicate, which means that it cannot be reduced to, or completely analyzed in
terms of, ‘playing poker’ in the singular.
The question now is how are we to understand the truth conditions of a state-
ment of the above form, or more generally of the form (∃xAP)FP(x), and also of the 
form (∀xAP)FP(x) as well? It is one thing to say that pluralities are the values of the 
variables in a formula, but what are pluralities, and how are they to be represented 
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 77
here both as to what we are referring to and what the predicate says about them? 
What, in other words, is the semantics or logic of pluralities?
Our answer is that a plurality is essentially what Bertrand Russell called a class 
as many as a plurality in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics, by which Russell 
did not mean either a set or a class as an abstract entity.36 To be sure, Russell 
gave up the notion of a class as many as a plurality after 1903 as hopelessly con-
fused, and that is just what Peter Geach claimed when he described it as “radically 
incoherent”.37 But Geach was wrong, because by following Russell s three basic 
principles regarding classes as many we have been able to formalize a logic of 
classes as many that is not only coherent but consistent as well.38
Russell assumed three important features about his notion of a plurality as a 
class as many, and, as indicated, each is valid in our logic of classes as many. The 
first is that a vacuous common count noun, i.e., a common name that names 
nothing, denotes nothing, which is not the same as having an empty class as its 
extension. Thus, according to Russell, “there is no such thing as the null class [in 
the sense of a class as many as a plurality], though there are null class-concepts”, 
i.e., common-name concepts that have no extension, or denote nothing.39 Thus,
for example, the plurality, or class as many, of things that are not self-identical,
[x̂/x ≠ x], denotes nothing, i.e., ¬( ∃y)(y = [x̂/x ≠ x]) is a valid (provable) thesis
of our logic of plurals, which it will be remembered is based on a free first-order
logic. We use Λ as the symbol for the empty class as many, i.e.,
Λ=df [x̂/x ≠ x].
As indicated, it is provable in our logic of classes as many as pluralities that there 
is no empty class as many, i.e.,
¬( ∃x)(x = Λ)
is provable in our logic.
Now where membership in a plurality is defined as follows:
x ∈ y ↔ (∃A)[y = A∧ (∃zA)(x = z)],
the Russell plurality, or class as many of things that are not a member of them-
selves, also does not exist, i.e.,
36 For a 17th century anticipation by Thomas Vincentius Tosca of the distinction between 
a class as many and a class as one see Angelelli (1979).
37 Geach (1980a: 225).
38 See, e.g., Cocchiarella (2002).
39 Cocchiarella (2002, §69).
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Nino B. Cocchiarella78
¬(∃x)(x = [ŷ/(∃A)(y = A ∧ (y ∉ A))])
is also a provable thesis of logic of plurals. Note, incidentally, that in the definition 
of ∈ the occurrence of A in (y = A) is as a term denoting the plurality of things 
that fall under the name concept that A stands for, whereas the occurrence of A 
in the quantifier phrase (∃zA) stands for the name concept itself.
The second important feature assumed by Russell is that the class as many as 
a plurality that is the extension of a count noun that names just one thing is just 
that one thing. In other words, unlike the singleton sets of set theory, which are 
not identical with their single member, the class as many that is the extension of a 
common count noun that names just one thing is none other than that one thing. 
This is not really odd in fact because we sometimes refer to, or speak of, e.g., ‘some 
people’ in a context when, it turns out, there is just one person involved, just as 
we also occasionally use ‘some person’ in a context when there is more than one 
person involved. In addition, overall the logic of pluralities comes out much more 
smoothly when we allow that a plurality might consist of just one thing. Thus given 
that ‘Socrates’ denotes one thing, then
(Socrates ∈ Socrates) ∧ (∀x/x ∈ Socrates)(x = Socrates) 
is a true sentence, and similarly so is
(∃xSocrates)(∀ySocrates)(x = y).
Finally, the third feature cited by Russell is that, unlike sets, classes as many are 
literally made up of their members, which is why they are also called pluralities 
(Vielheiten), and not things that can themselves be members of classes.40 Thus, 
according to Russell, “though terms may be said to belong to … [a] class [as 
many], the class [as a plurality] must not be treated as itself a single logical 
subject”.41 Thus, if a plurality or class as many is made up of at least two objects, 
then that plurality cannot itself be a member of a class as many, i.e., it cannot be 
one among a plurality.
In turning to the semantics or logic of classes as many as pluralities, we note 
that inclusion in a class as many, or being part of a plurality, can be defined in 
terms of membership, i.e., the relation of being among:
40 The idea that sets also have their being in their members is philosophically problematic 
when we consider the empty set, which would mean that it has its being in nothing, 
and hence that it itself is nothing. But the empty set is essential to pure set theory and 
therefore is not nothing.
41 Russell (1903, §70).
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 79
x ⊆ y ↔ (∀z)[z ∈ x → z ∈ y].
As indicated, the inclusion relation, ⊆, of our logic of classes as many can also 
be used to represent the part-to-whole relation that is essential to any account 
of mass-noun reference and predication. The logic of mereology as described in 
the Leonard-Goodman’s calculus of individuals is in fact reducible to our logic of 
classes as many, or at least the atomistic (free-logic) version is.42 Proper inclusion, 
x ⊂ y, is definable of course in terms of inclusion:
x ⊂ y ↔ x ⊆ y ∧ y ⊈ x.
What is an “atom” (in the sense of our logic), or “single thing”, i.e., an “individual”, 
is analyzable in the logic of classes as many as follows:
Atom =df [x̂/¬( ∃y)(y ⊂ x)].
That is, to be an atom, or individual, is to be something that has no proper sub-
part.43 In the case of mass nouns, which we will deal with next, an atom is the 
same as a minimal part. There are a number of interesting features of the logic of 
classes as many as pluralities that we will not go into here, but the details of which 
can be found in my paper of 2002. We should also note, however, that combining 
pluralities of the same kind results in a plurality of that same kind:
(∀x/x ⊆ A)(∀y/y ⊆ A)[(x ∪ y) ⊆ A].
In other words, pluralities are cumulative. As we will see, so too are what mass 
nouns denote.
Now the semantics or logic underlying plural reference is given in terms of 
the logic of classes as many as pluralities.44 As already noted, we use meaning 
postulates to connect the logical forms at the level of our speech and mental acts 
with the logical forms at the level of the underlying logic of classes as many. Thus, 
for the plural reference of ‘Some AP are …’, we have the following principle as a 
meaning postulate (for plurals):
(MPP1) (∃xAP)(x) ↔ (∃x/x ⊆ [ŷA])(x).
42 See Eberle (1970, Chapter 2), for a reconstruction of the calculus of individuals in a 
free first-order logic.
43 This ‘atom’ terminology goes back to Nelson Goodman and the so-called Leonard-
Goodman calculus of individuals.
44 For a set-theoretic semantics as well see the appendix of Cocchiarella (2002).
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Nino B. Cocchiarella80
Accordingly, for the statement that some men are playing poker we have the 
following biconditional connecting the logical form of the speech act with the 
logical form of the truth conditions of that act:
(∃xManP)Playing-pokerP(x) ↔ (∃x/x ⊆ [ŷMan])Playing-pokerP(x).
Now given that ‘playing poker’ is a distributive predicate in only one direction, 
i.e., that
Playing-pokerP(x) → (∀y/y ∈ x)Playing-poker(y)
is true, then the right-hand side of the above biconditional is provably equivalent 
to the formula
[ŷ Man/Playing-poker(y)] ≠ Λ.
That the plurality (class as many) of men playing poker is not empty is equivalent 
of course to saying that some men are playing poker.
Let us turn now to how the universal plural ‘AllP ’, the meaning postulate of 
which is given as follows:
(MPP2) (∀xAP)(x) ↔ (∀x/x ⊆ [ŷA])(x).
Now given that the cognitive structure of an assertion of ‘All men are mortal’ is 
represented as,
(∀xManP)MortalP(x),
then, by (MPP2), it follows that, semantically, the assertion amounts to predica-
ting mortality to every plurality of men,
(∀x/x ⊆ [ŷMan])MortalP(x),
which is equivalent to saying that the members of the entire group of men taken 
collectively are mortal:
(∀x/x = [ŷMan])MortalP(x).
In conceptualist terms, this formula comes very close to what Russell claimed in 
his 1903 Principles, namely, (to use Russell’s terminology) that the denoting phrase 
‘All men’ in the sentence ‘All men are mortal’ denotes the class as many of men.
Note that the predicate ‘mortal’ is distributive (in both directions), a fact that 
is represented by the following meaning postulate:
(∀x)[MortalP(x) ↔ (∀y/y ∈ x)Mortal(y)].
It follows, accordingly, that the statement that all men are mortal,
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 81
(∀xManP)MortalP(x),
is provably equivalent to the different statement that every man is mortal:
(∀xMan)Mortal(x).
Of course, there are plural predicates that are not distributive (in either direction) 
and which therefore cannot be reduced in this way.
Plural identity, as in ‘The triangles that have equal sides are (identical with) 
the triangles that have equal angles’, is based on the plural of the copula for both 
subject and direct object. The relation Are as the plural of Is can be represented 
by the following λ-abstract:
Are =df [λx[λyIs(x,y)]
P]P.
For convenience, we will ignore going through several applications of the me-
aning postulate about Is that leads to a reduction of Are to an identity between 
terms. We will simply use the identity sign instead. In other words, although ‘AP 
are BP’ is definable as [λx[λyIs(x,BP)]P]P(AP), it is simpler for our present purpose 
here to represent ‘AP are BP’ simply as ‘A = B’, with which, by meaning postulates, 
[λx[λyIs(x,BP)]P]P(AP) is provably equivalent.
Plural identity, we note, is involved in the truth conditions for statements with 
two plural definite descriptions, just as singular identity is involved in the truth 
conditions for two singular definite descriptions. Thus, just as the statement that 
the spy is the bald man can be symbolized as follows:
(∃1xSpy)Is(x, [∃1yMan/Bald(y)]),
which reduces to:
(∃1xSpy)(∃1yMan/Bald(y))(x = y),
so too in an entirely similar way we can formalize the statement that the spies 
are the bald men:
(∃1xSpy
P)Are(x, [∃1yMan
P/BaldP(y)]),
which reduces to:
(∃1xSpy
P)( ∃1yMan
P/BaldP(y))(x = y).
Now the logical analysis of a statement of the form The AP are FP can be given as 
follows:
(∃1xA
P)FP(x) ↔ (∃xAP)[(∀yAP)(y = x) ∧ FP(x)],
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Nino B. Cocchiarella82
for when the plural definite description is being used with existential presuppositi-
on. This of course is similar to the Russellian analysis for the singular form ‘The A 
is F’. From this it follows that if F is distributive then the plural definite description 
‘The AP are FP’ denotes the class as many of A that are F, i.e.,
(∃1xA
P/FP(x))(x = [ŷA/F(y)]),
which explains why we read [ŷA/F(y)] as the ‘A’s that are F’.
For a sentence of the form ‘The A’s that are F are the B’s that are G’, as in ‘The 
triangles that have equal sides are (identical with) the triangles that have equal 
angles’, the analysis or symbolization can be given as follows:
(∃1xA
PF P(x))Are(x, [∃1yB
P/GP(y)]),
which in our logic reduces to:
(∃1xA
PFP(x))(∃1yB
P/GP(y)])(x = y),
which of course can be further reduced by means of the above formula for plural 
definite descriptions.
Finally, we note that plurals also can be used with numerical quantifier phrases, 
as in ‘There are twelve Apostles’, as well as with numerical predicates, as in ‘The 
Apostles are twelve’. As is well-known, the predicate ‘twelve’ can be defined in 
terms of numerical quantifier phrase, such as (∃12y). For example, one analysis of 
‘The apostles are twelve’ is the following:
(∃1xApostle
P)[λx(∃12y)(y ∈ x)]P(x).
The quantifier phrase (∃12y) of course is readily definable in first-order logic (with 
identity).45 We can also define the predicate ‘twelve’ more generally as the concept 
of pluralities that have twelve members:
12 =df [λx(∃A)(x = A∧ (∃
12yA)(y ∈ x))].
A similar analysis applies of course for each natural number. ‘The Apostles are 
twelve’ can now be simply represented as:
(∃1xApostle
P )12(x).
45 We note that given the extensionality of the membership predicate ∈ (and its converse) 
the predicate [λx(∃12y)(y ∈ x)] is provably equivalent to [λx∈̆(x, [∃12y])]], where ∈̆ is 
the converse of ∈. The active quantifier (∃12y) in the predicate of the above formula 
can then be replaced by one that is deactivated for the speech act in question. We avoid 
doing so here for convenience.
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On Predication, A Conceptualist View 83
The sentence ‘There are twelve Apostles’ is more involved, however, because of the 
presence of two seemingly active quantifier phrases, namely ‘twelve’ and ‘There 
are’. An alternative reading of this sentence is ‘Twelve Apostles there are’, where 
the quantifier phrase ‘there are’ is now (part of) the predicate. Treating ‘there are’ 
as (part of) the predicate amounts to pluralizing ‘there is’ as a predicate, specifi-
cally as [λx(∃y)(x = y)]P.46 The sentence ‘Twelve Apostles there are’ can then be 
analyzed as:
(∃12xApostleP)[λx(∃y)(x = y)]P(x),
which is reducible to:
(∃12xApostle)(x = x),
which amounts to saying indirectly that there are twelve Apostles.47 A similar ana-
lysis can be given more generally for sentences of the form ‘There are n many AP’.
We conclude that our conceptualist account of predication in terms of the 
mutual saturation of referential and predicable concepts as unsaturated cognitive 
capacities applies to plural predication as well as to singular predication. In ad-
dition we have shown how sentences based on plural reference and predication 
can be analyzed in terms of the logically perspicuous forms of our conceptualist 
logic, which includes a logic of classes as many as pluralities.
8. Mass Noun Reference and Predication
We now turn to our analysis of mass-noun reference and predication. The details 
of our analysis are similar to that for plural reference and predication, which is 
not surprising given the grammatical similarity between plurals and mass nouns, 
such as the fact that mass nouns can take only those determiners that can also 
be used with plurals.48
Mass nouns can be complex, such as ‘polluted water’, ‘tall grass’, ‘modern fur-
niture’, etc., as well as simple, such as ‘milk’, ‘gold’, ‘furniture’, etc. Some nouns in 
46 The predicate [λx(∃y)(x = y)]P can be replaced by [λxIs(x,[∃y])]P, with which it is 
identical by meaning postulates, so that there is no active quantifier in the predicate.
47 Note that the consequent of the formula is equivalent to a trivially provable thesis, 
namely that whatever is in x is something:
 [λx(∃y)(x = y)]P(x) ↔ (∀z/z ∈ x)(∃y)(z = y),
which means that the consequent is equivalent to x = x.
48 For an account of the similarities between mass nouns and plurals, see, e.g., Nicolas 
(2008).
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some contexts function as mass nouns and in other contexts as count nouns, 
e.g., ‘chicken’ as in ‘George ate a lot of chicken’ (mass noun) and ‘George has five
chickens in his back yard’ (count noun).
As already noted for count nouns, we assume that we can distinguish in a 
given speech context the common names that represent mass nouns from those 
that represent count nouns; but we do not assume that there is an absolute, fixed 
distinction between count and mass nouns.49
In regard the logical forms for expressing mass-noun reference and predication, 
we extend the inductive definition of the meaningful (well-formed) expressions 
of our conceptualist framework to include the following clauses:
(1) if A represents a mass noun (in a given context), then AM is a mass name (in
that context);
(2) if A represents a mass noun (in a given context), x is a first-order variable,
and x is a formula, then [x̂A/x]M and [x̂/x]M are (complex) mass names
(in that context);
(3) if A/(x) represents a (complex) mass noun (in a given context), then (A/x)M 
is AM/[λxx]M(x) and [x̂A/x]M is [x̂A/M[λxx]M(x)]; and
(4) if AM is a mass name (in a given context), x is a first-order variable, and  is a
formula, then (∀xAM) and (xAM) are formulas.
We note that clause (3) is needed to allow for the representation of such complex 
mass nouns as ‘polluted water’, i.e., ‘water that is polluted’. In addition, we note 
that in referring to all, some, a lot of, etc., water, we are referring to parts of water 
that have indefinitely many subparts that are again parts of water and that stand 
in the same relation to the larger part as the larger part to the whole. But having 
indefinitely many subparts, we note, is not the same as having infinitely many 
subparts; that is, it does not mean that there is an infinite descent of subparts.50
The various parts of water are not discrete, well-delineated single objects, i.e., 
“individuals”, in the way that the minimal parts are, namely, the molecules of 
water, which are discrete and well-delineated. Thus, although the minimal parts 
of what a mass noun denotes are individuals, and hence can be individuated, it is 
only the non-minimal parts that are problematic in this way.
We note that as with plural names mass names are not names simpliciter, and 
hence a mass name cannot occur as a term or argument of predicates. That role 
49 We will not deal with abstract mass nouns in this paper.
50 Having indefinitely many subparts is different from having infinitely many subparts 
partly because subparts themselves might have subparts, and in general there is no 
principle way to count all of the subparts.
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is already done by nominalized names simpliciter. That is the main difference 
here between mass names and names simpliciter: mass names do not occur as 
terms in our basic logical forms. In other words, mass names, like plural names, 
occur only in the logical forms that represent our speech or mental acts, and in 
particular as mass predicates in their role as mass predications or as part of mass 
quantifier phrases for mass reference. Finally, it is important to emphasize once 
again that we use meaning postulates to connect the logical forms of our speech 
or mental acts with the logical forms that give a more perspicuous representation 
of the deductive implications of our speech or mental acts, and hence of their 
truth conditions.
Now it is noteworthy that our underlying logic of classes as many contains 
an atomistic (free-logic) mereology as a subsystem, which of course is natural 
for pluralities – but not, according to some linguists and philosophers, for the 
semantics of mass nouns. Nevertheless, despite the negative view, we maintain 
that an atomistic mereology is appropriate for mass nouns. In our logic we can 
speak of the extension (at a given time) of a mass noun, which in fact consists 
just of the minimal parts of what that mass noun denotes (at that time). Of course 
that is not a problem for mass nouns representing elementary substances and 
chemical compounds, because such mass nouns in fact denote at a given time 
the total class as many of individual atoms or molecules of those substances and 
compounds existent at that time. The mass noun ‘gold’, for example, denotes now 
all of the gold, and therefore all of the gold atoms, that exists now; and ‘water’ 
similarly denotes now all of the water, and therefore all the molecules of water 
that exist now. Pieces or bits of gold and bodies of water, large or small, are all 
made up of the atoms of gold or molecules of water, and therefore they are really 
subpluralities – or subclasses of classes as many – of the total class as many, or 
plurality, of gold and water, respectively.
The mass nouns for space and time, to be sure, have traditionally been assu-
med not to have minimal parts, and of course mathematically that is a consistent 
assumption. In particular, it is not just conceivable, but consistent as well, that 
there should be an infinite descent of the parts of space and time. Nevertheless, 
it is noteworthy that in modern quantum physics space and time are “quantized”, 
and therefore do have minimal parts. The “Planck length” of 10–33 cm. is the smal-
lest length physically possible in quantum mechanics, and there is a smallest 
physically possible time as well, namely, the time it takes for light to cross the 
Planck length, which is 10–43 seconds. This means that real space and time are not 
infinitely divisible after all.
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Nino B. Cocchiarella86
Mass nouns other than those for elementary substances and molecules built 
up from such elements are also unproblematic, we maintain. The mass noun ‘fur-
niture’, for example, clearly denotes all of the individual pieces of furniture, and 
similarly ‘jewelry’ and ‘silverware’ denote all the individual pieces of jewelry or 
silverware. Mass nouns such as ‘wine’, ‘milk’, ‘coffee’, etc., also clearly do not have 
an infinite, unending descent of parts that are also wine, milk or coffee.
Is there an atomistic theory for the semantics of mass nouns implicit in natural 
language or our commonsense framework? That is certainly not obvious; but it is 
an interesting hypothesis. It has been suggested by Henry Laycock, for example, 
who thinks that “a kind of atomic theory is implicit in the ordinary use of mass 
terms based on our experience of the behavior of stuff ”.51 In other words, accor-
ding to Laycock, we should “think of stuff as a plurality of things, each of the same 
kind for any given kind of stuff ”, and in that way we can “construe any mass term 
‘m’ as a plural sortal of the form ‘m elements’”.52 An atomistic mereology for mass 
nouns is appropriate, in other words, not just because there is no infinite descent 
in nature, but also because such a view would explain the source of the grammati-
cal similarities between the semantics of mass nouns and that of plurals. A similar 
position is taken by Gennaro Chierchia who suggests that a “mass noun simple 
denotes a set of ordinary individuals plus all the pluralities of such individuals”.53 
Chierchia recognizes that this “view is an ‘atomistic’ one: we are committed to 
claiming that for each mass noun there are minimal objects of that kind, just like 
for count nouns, even if the size of these minimal parts may be vague”.54
In any case, as we will see, our atomistic logic of classes as many as pluralities 
works just as well for mass nouns as it does for plurals. In addition, one conse-
quence of this logic is that each nominalized mass noun denotes at any given time 
the entire class as many of its minimal parts, i.e., the “atomic”, minimal parts of 
the mass noun that exist at that time, which also means that it denotes the sum 
of all of its parts (existent at that time).
51 Laycock (1972: 39). 
52 Laycock (1972: 38).
53 Chierchia (1998: 54). Unlike Chierchia, however, I assume that a mass noun occur-
ring as a term denotes not the set of its minimal parts but, qua plurality, the class as 
many of its minimal parts. Also, whereas Chierchia maintains that every plurality 
consists of two or more members, I allow single individuals to be pluralities. (I did 
initially require groups to contain two objects in my 2002 paper, but I later changed 
that in my 2009 paper.)
54 Chierchia (1998: 54).
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The meaning postulates connecting the logical forms representing our speech 
and mental acts in the case of mass nouns are given in a way entirely analogous 
to those already stipulated for plural reference and predication. Thus, just as the 
plural count noun phrase ‘some AP’, in symbols, (∃xAP), was interpreted as (∃xA/x 
⊆ A), which can be read as ‘Some plurality of A things’, so too a similar interpre-
tation applies to mass nouns. That is, where AM is taken as a mass name in a given 
context, then ‘Some AM’ can also be read informally as ‘Some part of A’, which can 
then be interpreted as follows:
(Sm/Mass) (∃xAM)x ↔ (∃x/x ⊆ A)x.
Also, because ‘All AM’ is the dual of ‘Some A’, then ‘All AM’, which, when AM is a 
mass name, can also be read informally as ‘Every part of A’, is similarly interpre-
ted as:
(All/Mass) (∀xAM)x ↔ (∀x/x ⊆ A)x.
Thus a sentence such as ‘Water is a fluid’, by which of course we mean ‘All water 
is a fluid’ can be symbolized as follows, where the predicate ‘is a fluid’ is based 
on the copula:
(∀xWaterM)Is(x, [∃yFluidM]),
which by (All/Mass) and (Sm/Mass) and the identity theory of the copula reduces 
to:
(∀x/x ⊆ Water)(∃y/y ⊆ Fluid)(x = y),
which says that every part of water is part of some fluid.
Predication in the sentence ‘Water is in the radiator’ is not based on the copula 
but rather on the relation of being in the radiator, and of course it is not all water 
that is in the radiator, but only some water:
(∃xWaterM)In(x, [∃1yRadiator]),
which by the meaning postulate (Sm/Mass) and the extensionality (in the presu-
med context55) of the relation of being in the radiator reduces to
(∃x/x ⊆ Water)(∃1yRadiator)In(x, y).
55 There are other uses of the relation “in” that are not extensional, such as the relation 
of “in” between a story or someone’s belief space and the propositions that make up 
the content of that story or that person’s belief space.
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Nino B. Cocchiarella88
What these last two examples also show is that predication is not always inter-
preted in the same way when mass nouns are the grammatical subject; that is, it 
may be universal as in ‘Water is a fluid’ or particular as in ‘Water is in the radiator’.
Another type of problem arises when more than one determiner or quantifier 
phrase occurs in a sentence. The sentence ‘There is some water in the radiator’ has 
two determiners, for example, namely ‘There is’ and ‘some’. Most logic texts would 
interpret this as above, i.e., as ‘Some water is in the radiator’, which amounts to 
ignoring the first quantifier phrase ‘There is’. An alternative reading is possible, 
however, and is similar to our earlier example with the plural sentence ‘There are 
twelve Apostles’, which we interpreted as ‘Twelve Apostles there are’. The sentence 
‘There is some water in the radiator’ would be interpreted then as ‘Some water in 
the radiator there is’, which would be symbolized as:
(∃xWaterM/In(x, [∃1yRadiator])[λx(∃z)(x = z)]
M(x),
which by the meaning postulate (Sm/Mass) and λ-conversion reduces to the abo-
ve analysis for ‘Some water is in the radiator’, which of course is what it should 
reduce to.56
What about when a mass noun is not the subject but the predicate of a sen-
tence? In predicate position, the phrase ‘is water’ is interpreted as ‘x is some water’, 
which, semantically, is interpreted as ‘x is identical with some water’, so that the 
‘is’ in this case is really the copula. Thus, e.g., the sentence ‘The puddle is water’ 
is analyzed as:
(∃1yPuddle)Is(y, [∃xWater
M]),
which, by the meaning postulates for Is and (Sm/Mass), reduces to:
(∃1yPuddle)(∃x/x ⊆ Water)(y = x).
Finally, we note that because the logic of classes as many contains an atomistic 
mereology, we have as a theorem of the system that combining two parts of water 
results in another part of water, i.e.,
(∀x/x ⊆ Water)(∀y/y ⊆ Water)[(x ∪ y) ⊆ Water]
56 By the extensionality of [λx(∃z)(x = z)]M, which is represented as follows:
 (∀x)([λx(∃z)(x = z)](x) ↔ (∀w/w ⊆ x)( ∃z)(w = z)),
it follows that in the above context the predicate [λx(∃z)(x = z)]M(x) is vacuous and 
trivially equivalent to x = x. This predicate is provably identical with [λxIs(x, [∃z])]M, 
in which the quantifier has been deactivated.
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is provable in our logic, which of course parallels the same result for plurals. This 
is another respect in which mass nouns are like plurals. Another observation is 
that because being part of in our logic means being a subclass (as many) of, then 
it follows that mass nouns are provably distributive:
(∀xAM)(∀y/y ⊆ x)(∃zAM)(y = z).
In other words, if x is some part of what a (nominalized) mass name A denotes, 
then every part of x is also some part of what A denotes. But let us note that even 
though a hydrogen atom and an oxygen molecule are in some appropriate sense 
“part of ” some molecule of water, it does not follow that they also part of some 
water in our sense of part-of, namely ⊆, which is based on membership in a class 
as many.
9. Concluding Remarks
Our basic thesis is that the unity of an assertion as a speech act, and of a judg-
ment as a mental act, whether overtly expressed or not, consists in the mutual 
joint-exercise of an unsaturated referential and predicable concept in which each 
saturates the other in a kind of mental chemistry that results in an event, namely 
a mental act and a speech act as well if the mental act is overtly expressed. In 
our theory, referential and predicable concepts are unsaturated, complementary, 
intersubjective cognitive capacities that underlie our rule following abilities in 
the use of language, and in particular of our use of referential and predicable 
expressions. Referential expressions are represented in our logic by quantifier 
phrases restricted by a name, proper or common, and simple or complex. We have 
shown how our theory of predication applies to plural and mass noun reference 
and predication no less so than to predication in the indicative mode.
Our underlying logic for both plurals and mass nouns is a logic of classes as 
many as pluralities. The important new move in this logic is allowing a trans-
formation of the names that are part of quantifier phrases into names that can 
occur as “terms”, i.e., as arguments of predicates. What these new terms denote 
are pluralities, including the pluralities that consist of the minimal parts of what 
mass nouns denote. This logic has been developed in detail elsewhere, along with 
a set-theoretic semantics.57 Both pluralities and the denotata of mass nouns (as, 
e.g., the various parts of water), are represented as being on the same logical
level as individuals or single objects (each of which is itself a plurality or class as
many of one), which is the way they are represented in natural language. This is
57 See Cocchiarella (2002).
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Nino B. Cocchiarella90
different from most other treatments today of plurals by philosophers of logic. 
But as I have shown elsewhere, the principal alternative approach to the logic of 
plurals is reducible to the approach described here.58
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